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Abstract
Common–interest community agreements on private lands provide opportunity and scale for wildlife mana-
gement.— Private lands are critical to conservation planning for wildlife, worldwide. Agriculture subsidies, tax 
incentives, and conservation easements have been successfully used as tools to convert cropland to native 
vegetation. However, uncertain economies threaten the sustainability of these incentives. The wildlife mana-
gement profession is in need of innovative models that support effective management of populations. I argue 
that biologists should consider the option of facilitating the development of private reserves to reduce the 
dependence of conservation on public investment. Private reserves can be enhanced by creating common–
interest communities, which reduce the problem posed by limited size of individual properties. Cross–property 
agreements between landowners can provide economic incentives through forms of ecotourism, energy produc-
tion, and/or enhanced agricultural production. I share two case studies that demonstrate how cross–property 
agreements may be beneficial to landowner’s finances and conservation of diverse wildlife communities, as well 
as providing an efficient structure for NGOs and management agencies to engage and support landowners. 
Key words: Conservation biology, Conservancy, Economics, Landscape, Policy, Private lands.
Resumen
Acuerdos comunitarios de interés común sobre los terrenos privados proporcionan oportunidades y extensión para 
la gestión de la naturaleza salvaje.— En todo el mundo, los terrenos privados son críticos para la planificación de 
la conservación de la naturaleza salvaje. Los subsidios agrícolas, los incentivos fiscales y las servidumbres para 
la conservación han sido utilizados con éxito como herramientas para convertir las tierras de cultivo en vegetación 
nativa. Sin embargo, las incertidumbres económicas amenazan la sostenibilidad de dichos incentivos. La gestión 
profesional de la naturaleza salvaje precisa de la innovación de los modelos que dan soporte efectivo a la gestión de 
las poblaciones. Opino que los biólogos deberían considerar la opción de facilitar el desarrollo de reservas privadas, 
con el fin de reducir la dependencia de la conservación basada en las inversiones públicas. Puede estimularse la 
creación de reservas privadas creando comunidades de interés común, que reduzcan el problema impuesto por 
el tamaño limitado de las propiedades individuales. Los acuerdos entre propietarios sobre sus terrenos pueden 
proporcionar incentivos económicos en forma de ecoturismo, producción de energía y/o una mejor producción 
agrícola. Comparto los estudios de dos casos que demuestran cómo los acuerdos entre propiedades pueden 
beneficiar tanto a las finanzas de los propietarios de las tierras como a la conservación de diversas comunidades 
silvestres, así como proporcionar una estructura eficaz para ONGs y agencias de gestión en el compromiso de 
dar soporte a los propietarios.
Palabras clave: Biología de la conservación, Preservación, Economía, Paisaje, Política, Terrenos privados.
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Introduction
Private lands are critical to conservation planning 
for wildlife worldwide. However, conservation efforts 
have primarily focused on public lands (Knight, 1999; 
Brown, 2010). Public lands certainly offer permanency 
of purpose, and public lands biologists enjoy a large 
degree of ownership of the decision to implement 
management decisions on the landscape. These stra-
tegies may be effectual when public lands dominate 
a region or country (fig. 1, table 1). 
But, private lands (defined as land under free-
hold or leasehold by individuals, not including land 
native communal lands; Swift et al., 2003) comprise 
the majority of many countries’ land base (table 1). 
Thirty–six of 50 US states have > 75% of their area 
managed by private landowners (fig. 1). Private 
lands biologists work in an arena in which they can 
only offer support for decisions in a landscape that 
is highly volatile with regard to alternative land uses. 
Both game species and threatened species stand to 
gain from well–positioned strategies for conservation 
on private lands. Conservation on private lands has 
emerged as a critical direction (Knight, 1999). 
Here, I describe challenges to private lands con-
servation from logistic and ecological perspectives. I 
suggest that common–interest communities should be 
considered as a viable option to create incentives for 
conservation on private reserves, while also providing 
scale that can support ecological processes that lead to 
successful conservation efforts. I assess the most com-
mon incentive tools for conservation on private lands. 
And, I provide two case studies to support Schultz’s 
(2010) suggestion that society’s demand for natural 
places may operate to encourage private landowners 
to work across property lines to produce goods and 
services that large, intact landscapes can provide.
Challenges
Challenges to provide incentives 
The primary challenge to conservation on private lands 
is to provide an incentive to landowners, as conser-
vation measures may conflict with ventures designed 
to realize economic value from the land investment. 
Simply stated, landowners/investors must realize a 
profit. Aldo Leopold, writing in the 1940s, expressed 
frustration with farmers in Wisconsin who did not con-
tinue to implement soil conservation measures after an 
initial 5–year period of public investment of labor and 
machinery (Leopold, 1949). That frustration pervades 
the ranks of conservationists today, especially those 
who are not empathetic with the notion that resilient 
conservation practices must stand on the shoulders 
of economically resilient farm and ranch ventures. 
Wunder (2000) stated that the success of conser-
vation incentives depends on the structure inherent 
in the mode of participation—how does conservation 
compare with other productive activities? Conserva-
tion incentives will have conservation impact only if 
they change labor and land allocation decisions on a 
sustainable basis. In the US, the incentive challenge 
is perhaps greatest in regions with productive soils 
and adequate precipitation (fig. 2), where row–crop 
agriculture is the wise investment on the landscape 
because of record high prices for corn (fig. 3; July 
2012 spot market, Nebraska USA: US$275–314/
metric ton), soybeans (US$588–624/metric ton), and 
wheat (US$293–330/metric ton). 
Agriculture subsidies
The Food Security Act of 1985 ('Farm Bill'; Brown, 2010) 
served as a subsidy program to address concerns of 
soil erosion (wind and water) and price supports in the 
US. Conservation efforts are now implicit objectives 
in the current Farm Bill, and Farm Bill programs have 
been used as the primary method to convert cropland 
to native vegetation with successful short–term benefits 
(Haufler, 2005). Indeed, the job title of private lands 
biologists in the US is commonly 'Farm Bill Biologist'. 
The Farm Bill is an extensive government program; the 
Conservation Reserve Program (one program within 
the Farm Bill) paid US$1.7 billion in annual payments in 
2012 to 737,699 contracts (most 10–year) on 409,253 
farms (11,975,550 ha; United States Department 
of Agriculture, 2012). Similar subsidy programs are 
available in Europe through the Common Agricultural 
Policy (Pain & Pienkowski, 1997), but are not an option 
in most Latin American Countries because of budget 
priorities (Swift et al., 2003). 
It is very reasonable to expect that the combination 
of the US’ current budget shortfalls and the high rental 
rates now needed to compete with current rental rates 
offered for production purposes (fig. 3) may result in 
a loss of the diversity of types of direct payments in 
the next Farm Bill that would benefit wildlife habitat. 
There is no argument that subsidy programs have 
created benefits for wildlife on millions of acres in the 
US (Haufler, 2005), but the future of this program as 
the primary means to support conservation on private 
lands is in doubt.
Tax incentives
A recent development in several states in the US is the 
availability of tax incentives to farmers who pledge to 
keep their land in agricultural production or landowners 
with forests who pledge to manage them in an approved 
manner (Salkon et al., 2001). Agricultural tax credits 
may be useful to wildlife conservation in regions with 
a high degree of urban expansion, as the incentive 
may keep the land owner from transforming the farm 
into residential communities or industrial complexes. 
For example, in Nebraska, USA, a Greenbelt 
Tax was created to reduce development of urban 
areas along rural, riverine corridors (T. LaGrange, 
Nebraska Game and Parks Commission, personal 
communication). Agricultural landowners typically see 
their property values increase if urban growth creates 
development potential for their farm land. A person 
owning 65 ha in Lancaster County, Nebraska, for 
example, would be levied an additional US$2600 in 
annual property taxes if their land’s value increased 
from US$1200/ha to US$3600/ha. Such an increase 
might surpass current economic margins for crop 
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production; it might be seen as especially unpala-
table for a landowner interested in non–agricultural, 
recreational uses. A housing development or office 
complex could result. The Green Belt Tax status would 
allow the landowner to pay property taxes based on 
the agricultural value of the land rather than the full 
market value. It should be noted that the Greenbelt 
Tax only applies to agricultural and horticultural uses; 
a private nature reserve would not qualify for the 
incentive. However, the precedent of tax incentives 
exists, and state laws could be structured to provide 
tax incentives to private landowners who dedicate and 
properly manage a private nature reserve. 
Salkon et al. (2001) noted that tax incentives do 
not provide long term security for conservation efforts 
(table 2). Tax incentives for conservation have been 
used in some Latin American countries, but they are 
often withdrawn in times of economic insecurity (Swift 
et al., 2003). Even if the tax incentive remains, the 
price paid by developers for land may eventually ex-
ceed the maximum compensation through tax relief. 
Conservation easements
Easements are used throughout the US (Salkon et al., 
2001), Latin America (Swift et al., 2003), and Europe 
(conservation covenants; Kiesecker et al., 2007) by 
private landowners to restrict the future uses of their 
property. A land trust is often created to be the reci-
pient of the benefits of the easement (Schutz, 2010), 
and the recipient purchases the easement from the 
landowner. Easements are attractive to landowners, 
because the land remains in private ownership and 
owners continue to live on the land and derive benefit 
from farming, ranching, forestry, or other activities. 
Landowners often receive income from the sale of the 
easement, and this sale value varies by the market va-
lue of the land, the conservation need for the property 
(in fact, some landowners may find it difficult to find 
a third party with interest to purchase an easement), 
and local agreements. A landowner may donate a 
portion or all of the sale of the easement back to the 
land trust, reducing their income from the easement 
sale. However, their contribution may be considered 
a charitable donation, which can provide significant 
income and/or estate tax benefits derived from the 
state and federal government (Salton et al., 2001).  
Conservation easements are usually designed to be 
perpetual in nature (table 2). But, as Schutz (2010) noted, 
such easements are enabled by state legislation, and 
easements are the common subject of legislation (e.g., 
Legislature of Nebraska, 2012) that would affect their use. 
Of primary concern in rural districts is the potential loss 
of property tax, and thus support to county government 
and local schools. Easements are often the first step 
Fig. 1.  Percent of area under private ownership (non–state or non–federal) in the states of the USA, 
based on data collected by the Natural Resource Council of Maine.
Fig. 1. Porcentaje de propiedad privada (ni estatal, ni federal) en los estados de EUA, basado en datos 
recogidos por el Consejo de Recursos Naturales de Maine.
N
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towards the eventual sale of the property to a state or 
federal wildlife agency that may pay no property taxes, or 
may pay property taxes at a much lower property tax rate 
than a private landowner (Lancaster County, Nebraska, 
standard rate: US$0.0027/$100 valuation; Lower Platte 
South Natural Resources District rate: US$0.0004/$100 
valuation; Lancaster County, 2011). The loss of property 
tax to Lancaster County, USA for the 65–ha property in 
the previous example, would be $3900/year for land worth 
US$3600/ha. Ten landowners making a similar decision 
would reduce income to the County equal to one gover-
nment salaried worker (e.g., teacher, road maintenance, 
social aide). Therefore, the benefit to the individual (tax 
relief) is seen as a cost to the local community. 
Creation of reserves
A governmental or non–governmental organization 
(NGO) may purchase a tract of land from an individual 
for the purposes of creating a nature reserve. The 
incentive to the individual is the fair market price (or 
sometimes premium price) paid by the government or 
NGO at the time of the sale. Thus, the land is removed 
from development and can be restored to native ve-
getation or protected in a native state. Individuals can 
also develop private reserves on their land, although 
the official recognition (and economic incentives, if any) 
of private reserves varies from country to country, as 
well as from state to state within the US (Teer, 1999; 
Salkon et al., 2001; Swift et al., 2003).
Private reserves are routinely considered in the 
set of tools available to wildlife biologists engaged 
with private landowners in Latin America (Swift et al., 
2003) and southern Africa (Powell, 2010; Shaw & 
Marker, 2011), but they are not typically considered 
by biologists in the US (Salton et al., 2001) with the 
exception of the state of Texas (Teer, 1999). One 
factor in this shortcoming is that wildlife management 
students in the US are rarely required to take courses 
in business, tourism, or entrepreneurism, while their 
counterparts in nature conservation in southern Africa 
or Latin America (as examples) receive their education 
in the context of the economic benefits of properly 
managed populations of wildlife.
Wildlife biologists have long been aware of the po-
tential value from hunting, bird watching, nature walks, 
and environmental education on private lands, although 
resource ownership issues are complex (Freese, 1998; 
Teer, 1999; Thompson & Edwards, 2009). Such values 
are subject to variability in tourism markets, and the 
size and location of the reserve will affect its value to 
regional biodiversity, its draw to tourists or hunters, and 
its capacity to provide economic benefit to the land 
owner. These constraints or perceived risks may lead 
land owners to make the decision to sell their property 
to a government entity or NGO. Schutz (2010) suggests 
that private reserves could be supported by government 
during initial development to reduce these risks.
The advantage to private reserves is that they are 
not usually dependent on public subsidies, and the 
reserves generate profits as a private venture (table 2). 
Private land conservation has typically concentrated 
on methods that have substantial cost in public inves-
tment (through purchase to create a public reserve or 
payment of annual subsidy), as well as eventual loss 
of agriculture productivity and contribution to taxes 
(Salton et al., 2001). 
Challenges to support landowner decisions 
Wildlife management decisions are complex and have 
a level of uncertainty, even when made by trained 
wildlife biologists. Thus, private landowners face 
the same challenge of making smart decisions, and 
should be trained in decision–making processes that 
include the need for clarifying objectives, assessing 
alternative management options, assessing potential 
risk of alternatives, and coordinating decisions with 
other current decisions (Gregory & Keeney, 2002). 
Monitoring to determine the level of success of a ma-
nagement decision is also critical (Lyons et al., 2008). 
Landowners are not typically trained in concepts 
or techniques of wildlife management or conservation 
biology. Fortunately, farmers and ranchers are usua-
lly trained to manage domestic plants and animals 
Table 1. Percentage of land area of select 
countries that is in private ownership: a Private 
ownership statistics not available; percentage 
represents percent of country in agricultural land 
use; b China practices public land ownership 
with no freeholds, only leaseholds.
Tabla 1. Porcentaje de tierra de propiedad 
privada de los países seleccionados: 
a Estadísticas de propiedad privada no 
disponibles; el porcentaje representa el tanto 
por ciento de la tierra con uso agrícola; b China 
practica la propiedad pública de la tierra, 
que no permite la propiedad absoluta, sino 
únicamente el arrendamiento.
Country       %  Source
Australia 15 Forbes (1985)
Canada 10 Cahill & McMahon (2010)
China 0b Ho (2001)
Ethiopia 10a Cahill & McMahon (2010)
Germany 52a Cahill & McMahon (2010)
Latin American      
countries (most) > 80 Swift et al. (2003)
Namibia 43 Shaw & Marker (2011)
Spain 83a Cahill & McMahon (2010)
Tanzania 11a Cahill & McMahon (2010)
United Kingdom > 80 Harrison et al. (1977)
United States,      
excluding Alaska 75 NRCS (2001)
Zimbabwe 42a Cahill & McMahon (2010)
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(Powell, 2010), so concepts of population growth, 
competition, and sustainable harvest are familiar. 
Governments, agencies, NGOs, and universities have 
a critical role to provide for education of landowners 
(Swift et al., 2001). Training needs may be significant, 
which will result in costs to the agencies or NGOs. 
Ecological challenges to private lands conservation 
Swift et al. (2001) suggested that there are implicit eco-
logical challenges to addressing conservation concerns 
on private lands: (1) size limitations of private property, 
(2) ad hoc locations of reserves in relation to priority 
conservation areas, and (3) the need for long–term 
sustainability of a conservation system (table 2). 
Property size limitations
Conservation of biodiversity necessitates a diverse set 
of habitats (Toombs et al., 2010). The potential hetero-
geneity of habitats on a parcel of land increases with the 
size of the property. Farm– or ranch–level heterogeneity 
can be expected to be lower than landscape–level 
heterogeneity, because of farm– and ranch–level ma-
nagement decisions (e.g., type of grazing system or 
crop selection). As such, it would be rare for a single 
property to provide the diverse array of habitats nee-
ded for the conservation of a diverse community. So, 
biologists must engage with multiple landowners across 
the landscape to achieve most conservation goals in 
traditional incentive programs (table 2).
Second, the annual home range of most species of 
wildlife goes beyond the borders of a single property 
(e.g., sage grouse [Centrocercus urophasianus] mean 
annual movements: 11.3 km: Connelly et al., 1988; 
typical movements of > 10 km for white–tailed deer 
[Odocoileus virginianus] and mule deer [Odocoileus 
hemionus]: Frost et al., 2009). A landowner’s efforts 
to support the breeding needs of a deer population, 
for example, could be thwarted by a neighboring 
landowner’s overharvest during the fall. Efficient and 
effective use of conservation funds necessitates that 
the scale of animal movements be contained within 
the scale of conservation efforts (Scott et al., 1999).
Last, private reserves that use iconic species for 
hunting or non–consumptive income face the challen-
ge that many of these species occur at relatively low 
densities (Freese, 1998). Sustainable trophy harvest of 
white–tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus), for example, 
requires that hunters follow a strategy for take that 
allows deer to grow older and reach trophy status, 
as judged by antler size (Jenks et al., 2002). A single 
landowner, by the merits of the number of trophy deer 
required for profitable operation (one multi–day hunt 
for a trophy deer, including meals, guiding, and lodging 
may be approximately US$5,000), would have to own 
thousands of acres to engage in a sustainable venture. 
Fig. 2.  Relative economic return (per ha) of three potential commodities across a gradient of rainfall and 
soil productivity from arid climate (left) to more mesic climate (right). A describes thresholds where cattle 
grazing becomes more profitable than wildlife–based entrepreneurial activities, and B is threshold where 
row crops become more profitable than cattle grazing. Lines showing relative economic return would be 
expected to shift with market conditions.
Fig. 2. Retorno económico relativo (por ha) de tres productos potenciales a través de un gradiente de 
precipitación y producción del suelo desde un clima árido (izquierda) a un clima más moderado (derecha). 
A describe los umbrales donde el apacentamiento del ganado se hace más aprovechable que las activi-
dades emprendedoras basadas en la fauna salvaje, y B es el umbral donde las cosechas se hacen más 
provechosas que el pastoreo del ganado. Sería de esperar que la línea que muestra el retorno económico 
relativo cambiase junto las condiciones del mercado.
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Ad hoc location of private lands
Conservation biologists often identify ‘gaps’ in the 
landscape that are not protected by public reserves, 
yet are critical to a species of conservation concern 
(Scott et al., 1993). Private reserves have the po-
tential to fill such gaps, but not all private properties 
are positioned to connect corridors or create buffers 
around public areas (Swift et al., 2001) and thus 
complete a conservation strategy. Regardless of the 
tool used to provide incentive for conservation, this 
challenge will continue to require wildlife biologists 
to prioritize the geographic scope of their efforts on 
private lands (table 2).
The need for long–term protection
Conservation strategies should be aimed to increase 
resilience. Humans have reduced the resilience of 
agroecosystems by removing diversity and altering 
disturbance regimes. As altered systems, they may 
be more vulnerable to perturbation, and may quickly 
shift from a desired to less desired state (Folke et 
al., 2004). The perturbation may be ecological in 
nature (e.g., drought), but also political, social, or 
economic.  
The conservation incentives offered by agriculture 
subsidies, while affecting dramatic acreage of land (Bar-
barika, 2009), are not resilient to economic fluctuations. 
Grain prices (e.g., maize; fig. 3) are highly unpredictable 
from year, which creates instability for long–term conser-
vation because tradeoffs between subsidy payments and 
potential income from crop production are in constant 
flux. The benefits of local conservation efforts (e.g., Ne-
gus et al., 2010; Matthews, 2009) can disappear when 
incentives become less attractive than another inves-
tment option (fig. 4). Of the incentives traditionally used 
by private lands biologists, only conservation easements 
allow for long–term landscape transformation with the 
assumption that enabling legislation is not withdrawn. In 
contrast, owners of single– and multiple–owner private 
reserves have internal incentives to be successful over 
long periods of time, because of their personal inves-
tments in their ventures (table 2). 
Common interest communities
Potential
Private landowners who are interested in innovative, 
entrepreneurial conservation efforts will often have 
a need to work beyond the property limits of their 
land. Schutz (2010) suggested that common–interest 
communities may be a viable means of distributing 
benefits from nature–based entrepreneurial efforts on 
landscapes. A common–interest community is defined 
as an association of willing participants who accept 
Table 2.  Comparison of selected incentive programs for conservation on private lands, with respect 
to common ecological challenges after Swift et al. (2001). Programs are categorized with regard to 
the source of the motivation to meet the challenge: Landowner. Challenge overcome through internal 
landowner motivations; Public assistance. Challenge overcome through external motivations from 
government or NGOs; No. Challenge not likely to be overcome; a Challenge met only with considerable 
effort to target several neighbors; b Challenge met only through efforts to provide higher incentive to 
landowners in a selected watershed or region.
Tabla 2. Comparación de los programas de incentivación para la conservación de los terrenos privados, con 
respecto a los desafíos ecológicos comunes según Swift et al. (2001). Los programas están clasificados 
según la motivación para enfrentarse al desafío: Landlowner. Propietario, enfrentarse al desafío por las 
motivaciones internas del propietario; Public Assistance. Asistencia pública, enfrentarse al desafío por 
motivaciones externas del gobierno o las ONGs; No. No es probable que se enfrente al desafío; a Desafío 
encarado únicamente con considerable esfuerzo para incluir a varios vecinos. b Desafío encarado únicamente 
a través de los esfuerzos para proporcionar mayores incentivos a los propietarios de la tierra en una región 
o cuenca hidrológica determinada. 
  
                                                                  Ecological challenge
  Protects  Long–term 
Incentive Limited size priority location sustainability
Agriculture subsidies Public assistance a Public assistance b No
Tax incentives Public assistance a Public assistance b No
Conservation easements Public assistance a Public assistance b Landowner
Private reserve: single owner No No Landowner
Private reserve:      
common–interest community Landowner No Landowner
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rights and duties that are inherent in title to their real 
estate (Schutz, 2010). A common example is a ho-
meowners’ association found in urban development. 
Schutz (2010) argues that the common–interest 
community model could easily be extended to include 
private lands for the benefit of wildlife populations. 
Owners of a parcel of land within a present–day lake 
association, for example, are obligated to engage in 
and/or refrain from certain uses of their land. The 
association might hold a lake as association property 
for the benefit of the owners in common. Management 
of the fishery is an example of services performed 
by the association for its members, who may be 
regulated on the type of dock or boat housing they 
may construct with an eye toward holding property 
values at high levels for all members (Korth & Klessig, 
1990). Another form of common–interest community 
is a timber cooperative (Barten, 2001). Small, private 
landowners form agreements to market timber as an 
association to derive higher prices. The land remains 
in private ownership, but decisions on timber harvest 
are made as a group. As forest management is an 
indirect form of wildlife management, timber coope-
ratives are well–suited to develop additional income 
streams such as hunt leases or hiking retreats. 
It is easy to imagine the formation of a common–in-
terest community by neighboring farmers or ranchers. 
Such arrangements between neighbors can provide 
participants with geographically larger operations and 
greater economic return without purchasing more land, 
while also providing the legal framework in which to 
make joint decisions and to distribute costs and income 
among the participants. As such, common–interest 
communities would be well–suited to be used by private 
landowners with interests in creating a private reserve 
to support nature–based, entrepreneurial ventures.
Benefits of scale for wildlife
The formation of a common–interest community 
among neighbors results in the joint management of 
parcels of land. The co–managed landscape could 
be suitable for effective management of wildlife. This 
larger landscape under management allows structural 
heterogeneity of habitat to be established at multiple 
scales (Toombs et al., 2010), which further support 
diverse communities and protect rare species (Naidoo 
et al., 2011). In contrast, subsidy programs, tax in-
centives, conservation easements, and single–owner 
private reserves cannot, per se, provide the scale 
needed for conservation (table 2).
Large, co–managed properties allow the establis-
hment of 'zones' for management. Zones might be 
constructed around habitat types. Larger reserves allow 
more zones for different activities; more habitat zones 
should also result in more species of wildlife (Toombs 
et al., 2010), facilitating diverse use by tourists and 
increasing economic return (Naidoo et al., 2011).  
Zonation can also be used to set aside portions 
of the reserve for specific uses. For example, four 
Fig. 3.  Annual market price paid for corn (US$ per bushel) in Nebraska, USA during 1908–2011. The 5–year 
moving average is shown as a dotted line (data from the National Agricultural Statistics Service, USDA).
Fig. 3. Precio de mercado pagado anualmente por el maíz (US$ por cada 52 libras) en Nebraska, USA, 
durante el periodo 1908–2011. La línea de puntos muestra el promedio de la variación (datos del Servicio 
Estadístico Nacional de Agricultura, USDA).
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neighboring ranches in the Great Plains of the US 
may each support populations of greater prairie–
chickens (Tympanuchus cupido) on grazing lands 
for cattle (fig. 5A). If the ranchers are individually 
approached by a company offering to lease lands 
for wind energy platforms, each rancher might want 
to maximize the number of turbines on their pro-
perty because of direct competition with neighbors 
for a limited number of leases. Each ranch, then, 
would potentially be host to wind power (fig. 5B), 
and planning for siting would be conducted on a 
ranch–by–ranch basis. Some evidence suggests 
that prairie–chickens avoid large structures on the 
landscape (Hagen et al., 2011; Pruett et al., 2009), 
so it is possible that wind development on the four 
ranches could cause a decline in space available 
for prairie–chickens (fig. 5B). In addition, the access 
roads required for the wind development could also 
reduce the grazing capacity on each ranch. An al-
ternative scenario would be for the four ranches to 
form a common–interest community with the purpose 
to provide more effective planning and profit–base 
from wind energy, wildlife–based enterprises, and 
cattle. The results of a joint effort to find the most 
appropriate location for wind energy could allow the 
concentration of wind platforms on one section of the 
association’s lands, which would leave the majority 
of the prairie–chickens on the lands unaffected by 
foreign structures. The ranch might be able to de-
velop a rotational grazing schedule that could allow 
them to maintain stocking levels, across all ranches, 
close to the pre–association levels (fig. 5C).
Benefits of scale to investors
Private reserves will survive as long as private landow-
ners can maintain economic benefits. As investments, 
conservation done in this manner has the potential to 
pay for itself, but this demands that landowners have 
the training and education needed to make good 
decisions. 
Marketing strategies for ecotourism can be conduc-
ted more effectively and efficiently on behalf of a set 
of landowners with a large land base than for a single, 
smaller property (Powell, 2010). If separate landowners 
are competing for limited tourists, each must produce 
marketing materials, maintain web sites, attend ex-
positions, and provide staff to make reservations. An 
association of landowners can reduce these costs by 
cooperating. With a more diverse landscape (a better 
product) to market, an association may also realize 
more income (Naidoo et al., 2011). 
Last, landowners may also find NGOs and manage-
ment agencies willing to provide more time and exper-
tise to facilitate management plans, given the history of 
decisions of the landowner group (Powell, 2010). The 
association offers the advantage of a single contact 
point, and a mechanism to develop one management 
plan that impacts multiple farms or ranches. 
Case studies
Conservation through common interest communities 
on private reserves is a model that should be consi-
Fig. 4.   Area of private land under contract in the Conservation Reserve Program (Farm Bill) in Nebraska, 
USA during 1986–2010. The initial year for the program was 1986 (data from the National Agricultural 
Statistics Service, USDA).
Fig. 4. Área de terrenos privados bajo contrato del Programa de Conservación de Reservas (Conser-
vation Reserve Program, Farm Bill) en Nebraska, USA, durante el periodo 1986–2010. El año de inicio 
del programa fue 1986 (datos del Servicio Estadístico Nacional de Agricultura, USDA). 
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Fig. 5.  Depictions of the distribution of potential sources of revenue on four ranches in the Nebraska 
Sandhills region: A. Status quo, with cattle grazing and greater prairie–chicken populations on each of the 
ranches; B. Introduction of wind energy development on the four competing ranches; livestock stocking 
is potentially reduced, and prairie–chickens could be relegated to areas away from turbines (see text); C. 
Distribution of elements in B, but in the context of a common–interest community that optimizes wind energy 
development and cattle grazing, which allows for maintenance of prairie–chicken populations. Dotted lines 
show property boundaries, but allow flow of income and expenses among ranches.
Fig. 5. Descripciones de la distribución de las fuentes potenciales de ingresos de cuatro ranchos en la región 
de Nabraska Sandhills: A. Status quo, con ganado pastoreando y poblaciones de gallos de las praderas gran-
des en cada uno de los ranchos; B. Introducción de instalaciones de energía eólica en los cuatro ranchos; se 
observa una reducción potencial del ganado, y los gallos de las praderas podrían quedar relegados a zonas 
lejanas a las turbinas (véase el texto); C. Distribución de los elementos en B, pero en el contexto de una 
comunidad de intereses comunes que optimice el desarrollo de la energía eólica y el pastoreo del ganado, 
lo que permite el mantenimiento de las poblaciones de gallos de las praderas. Las líneas de puntos son los 
límites de las propiedades, pero permiten el flujo de entradas y salidas entre los ranchos.
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dered, especially when ecotourism efforts can result 
in meeting biodiversity or population goals for species 
of interest (Naidoo et al., 2011). Ecotourism is built 
on the notion that value can be realized from wildlife 
and landscapes (Freese, 1998). The following case 
studies support the theory that conservation can be 
achieved through the motivations of individual lan-
downers, when the appropriate structure is in place to 
empower them. Other examples of common interest 
communities exist throughout the world, especially 
in Australia, western North America, and central 
and southern Africa (Schutz, 2010); these two case 
studies provide details for contrasting examples on 
two continents.  
Freehold conservancies in Namibia
An example of a landscape–scale management sys-
tem can be found in the grasslands and shrublands 
of Namibia, in southern Africa, where cattle farmers 
have joined together to form conservancies. Before 
conservancies were established, many farmers built 
2–m game fences to restrict the flow of large, game 
animals. Conservancies provided a mechanism for 
neighbors to benefit from an integrated landscape 
(Shaw & Marker, 2011). Namibian landowners form 
agreements with neighbors about consumptive use 
limits, habitat management, water management, and 
ecotourism development. Namibian conservancies 
have from 5 to 58 farms and range from 75,650 to 
500,000 ha; size is generally limited, socially, by 
distances that neighbors are comfortable driving for 
meetings (Powell, 2010). 
Namibia is now home to 23 private conservancies, 
which are registered with the Ministry of Environ-
ment and Tourism. Each conservancy must have a 
constitution, which defines the relationship among its 
members and outlines its initial management plan. 
Conservancies may negotiate with the Ministry to 
become exempt from typical game permits and use 
restrictions (Shaw & Marker, 2011). Most conservan-
cies charge member fees to support basic operation 
or conservation efforts, either on a per hectare or per 
member basis (Powell, 2010).
Namibia’s conservancies each have a distinct 
flavor because of the heritage of their members 
and the landscapes in which they exist. Wildlife 
conservation and poaching protection are primary 
goals, which contribute to conservation efforts. But, 
members also list social networking as a goal, which 
indicates the importance of communication and trust 
between members. Last, and perhaps realistically, 
a goal of conservancies is profit. Powell (2010) 
quoted one conservancy officer, reflecting on their 
membership: ‘In their eyes, the conservancy will 
only be valuable for them if the conservancy can 
increase their profit.’
Namibia’s conservancies also exist across a 
gradient from arid to semi–arid to more mesic 
conditions. As the land becomes more productive 
(better soils, more precipitation), tradeoffs occur in 
profitability of potential ventures (fig. 5C; Brown, 
pers. comm., Namibian Nature Foundation). Wil-
dlife in Namibia are uniquely adapted to more arid 
zones (relative to domestic animals), and tend to 
be preferred as an investment in that environment; 
some landowners in arid regions of Namibia have 
removed all livestock from their farms in favor of 
‘farming with wildlife.’ However, in more productive 
zones, cattle co–exist with wildlife, because of the 
economic return that is available from livestock 
(fig. 2; Powell, 2010). Such a gradient creates 
contrasting landscapes in which for biologists to 
engage landowners; namely, private reserves and 
other conservation efforts may be easier to develop 
in regions with less productive lands (fig. 2). Row 
crops are not common in Namibia, but biologists in 
regions that can support row crops will encounter 
a situation in which the conservation trade–offs are 
further complicated by the high potential for return 
from production agriculture. Biologists are very 
aware of the geographic location of thresholds at 
which grazing becomes feasible (fig. 2A) and at 
which row–crop agriculture becomes more profitable 
than grazing (fig. 2B). 
Greater Gracie Creek Landscape
An example of the emerging nature–based entrepre-
neurship on private reserves can be found near on a 
4,800–ha ranch near Burwell, Nebraska, USA. In 2001, 
the younger generation of the Switzer family voiced 
an interest to return to the family’s cattle ranch, yet 
economic reality demonstrated that such a decision 
was impossible without additional ventures. The family 
began to diversify their cattle ranch by building a lodge 
and offering bird watching, boating, guided hunting, and 
horseback riding. The family found economic value in 
the leks (breeding grounds) of sharp–tailed grouse 
(Tympanuchus phasianellus) and greater prairie–chic-
kens, which they now share with their visitors during 
March and April each spring. The family business, 
Calamus Outfitters, provided initial opportunities for 
the second generation to live on the ranch, but the 
venture’s success was limited by the size of the ranch 
(Sortum, 2011). 
Recently, the Switzers joined with two neighboring 
ranches to form general agreements regarding access 
and use. The three ranches, as newly branded Greater 
Gracie Creek Landscape, have become the first private 
land area in Nebraska to be designated an Important 
Bird Area by the Audubon Society. The joint group also 
allows the Switzer’s to market their neighbors’ special 
beef, known as Morgan Ranch American Wagyu Kobe 
(Sortum, 2011). To date, the agreement between the 
Switzers and their neighbors has not officially reached 
the level of a legal association described as the com-
mon–interest community (Schutz, 2010), but those 
discussions continue.
The Switzers have become known as advocates 
for grassland conservation in the region, and will soon 
host the first annual Prairie Chicken Festival to show-
case educational and recreational activities on their 
ranch. Regardless of their fondness for conservation, 
the reality of private lands conservation is expressed 
in their statement: 'If it pays, it stays'. 
Animal Biodiversity and Conservation 35.2 (2012) 305
Conclusion
Common–interest communities, such as Namibia’s 
conservancies and the fledgling associated ranches in 
Nebraska, can provide incentive and scale for effective 
wildlife management. Private lands biologists should 
consider the potential for private investment to fuel 
conservation efforts that can be long–lasting and ro-
bust to changing economic and political environments.
Management agencies and NGOs must train biolo-
gists to facilitate multi–owner groups to promote cross–
property agreements for private reserves. The legal 
means to such ends will vary around the globe; in the 
US, the simple agreement used to form common–inter-
est communities such as housing and lake associations 
can be applied in rural settings (Schutz, 2010). 
The toolbox available to private lands biologists will 
continue to include, in some form, agriculture subsi-
dies, tax incentives, and conservation easements. 
But, it is time to embrace opportunities that exist on 
private reserves. Coordinating and facilitating the 
development of private reserves in the context of a 
common–interest community is not easy, as it involves 
managing people (Powell, 2010). But, Knight (1999) 
argued that the easy steps in conservation have 
been taken, and the future will involve many tough 
conversations and investments of time and energy to 
make advances in conservation on private properties. 
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